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CARDINAL NEWMAN.

BY MONCURE D. CONWAY.

I.

Many years ago, while visiting friends at Birmingham, my wife and I went to early mass at the Oratory, wishing to see "Father Newman." We were accompanied by an authoress—a devout member of the Church of England. It was about daybreak, but no day broke : it was so rainy, foggy, sleety, cold, dark, that—the Oratory being nearly a mile distant—we once or twice paused, hesitating to go on. Surely the aged and feeble father would never rise from his bed on such a morning, and we should only see one of his subordinates. We determined, however, to proceed, and at length groped our way into the Gothic building, which was totally unlighted. For a time we were the sole occupants. After a little while some Irish servant women came in at intervals, perhaps half a dozen. These, with ourselves, made the entire congregation on that dismal morning. Presently a young priest appeared through a small door in a corner of a chapel, bearing one tallow candle which he set on a desk, where it faintly revealed a small altar and a crucifix. The fog was in the room, in one-half of which the candle's beam only made darkness visible; but it shone on one picture, which I particularly remember. It was an old picture of St. Francis in ecstacy. The saint seemed to be in some cavern; all was hard, cold, desolate, around him; but there was a glory around his head and a rapture on his face.

While I was gazing on the picture, slow, irregular steps were heard descending a stairway; the little door of the alcove in the corner opened once more, and Father Newman appeared. He knelt in such a way that the candle was just behind his head, and the fog turned into a halo around it. When, presently his bent face was raised upward there was such radiance on it, that the neighboring picture of St. Francis became real. The dim corner of the chapel seemed a cavern, and the youthful face of the neophyte attending him was as that of a sustaining angel. During the celebration of the mass, the Father's face passed through several phases. At one moment he bore a curious resemblance to an aged woman; at another he was the very image of Emerson—a resemblance often remarked; but in all he was as striking a figure as my eyes ever beheld. On him was the stamp of mental power, of sincerity, of simplicity; but above all was that expression of St. Francis in his ecstasy—the look of one so far away from the world that he could not even be conscious of its sleet and fog, of its darkness at daybreak, or of souls groping through the miseries of earth, for whom his tallow candle and crucifix brought no sufficient guidance.

No doubt the picturesqueness of Father Newman, on this occasion, was partly due to the historic perspective through which I beheld him. To this son of a banker, born beside the Bank of England, the wealth and the progress of the world's commercial metropolis had become as so much dross. Born in the first year of our century, he had grown up under all the sunshine of its prosperity, and on him was lavished all the light of its culture. By his side modern science had published its marvellous revelations; Darwin, Lyell, Huxley, Tyndall and others had revolutionised man's conceptions of nature; under the researches of Max Müller, Strauss, Renan, Haug, biblical legends had taken their place with those of Brahmanism, Buddhism, Parseeism, in universal mythology. The political fashion of this world had passed away under his eyes. England had become a "crowned republic"; France had become a republic; Germany had been consolidated into a vast democratic empire; the Papacy had been reduced to a temporal power confined to the Vatican walls; Rome had become the capital of a secular government. What were all these to the man there in his dim corner of the world, with his upturned face? They were all but as the dust floating in the beams of his tallow candle. He rose to the head of his school at Ealing, he absorbed the learning of Oxford, he became the great preacher on whose words the youth of Oxford hung, breathless. There was no prize that England was not eager to bestow upon him. His path was clear to the archiepiscopal throne of Canterbury. In middle life, in the zenith of his career, he turned his back on all these things, left the proudest position gained by any religious leader in his century, and knocked at the door of a small Catholic church near Oxford, asking for admission as an humble member. There was no more prospect of any grand career for him in England. He sat there at Littlemore, along with Irish servant girls; and here,

after the lapse of more than a generation, I saw the aged man celebrating mass, on a bitter morning when every Protestant priest was snug in bed, for half a dozen domestics and three critical heretics.

As we were returning from the Oratory, impressed to silence by what we had witnessed, I felt that it was a phenomenon to be studied. I presently said to the devout lady with us, "How do you explain Father Newman? What can have caused a great scholar, orator, genius, to abandon the prospect of a splendid career in your church, and now, at over three-score and ten, to scorn the elements that he may say mass for a few Irish domestics."

"There is," she answered, "for me but one explanation: a glimpse of the supernatural world. Under that vision this world and its glories shrivel up."

The vivid recollections of that morning at the Birmingham Oratory returned on me to-day as I waited in the Brompton Oratory, London, (founded by Newman in 1850), to hear the requiem of the dead Cardinal, and the funeral discourse by the surviving Cardinal. Though I arrived an hour before the appointed time the church was nearly filled, and soon even the standing-room was occupied. My seat happened to be near the shrine of St. Mary Magdalene. There are three interesting pictures in it. One represents her bathing the feet of Jesus with her tears, the long golden hair falling on them. Another shows her kneeling before Jesus near the tomb, when with glad surprise she says, Rabboni, "*My* Master!" In the centre, over the altar, she is seen kneeling before the cross, in her grotto; she is pretty, but without any of the mingled voluptuousness and penitence which turned the word "Magdalene" into "Maudlin." Somehow, as I looked on the Magdalene kneeling before the man she mistook for the gardener, but afterwards declared to be the risen Jesus, I felt that she was the spiritual Mother of the dead Cardinal. "When Jesus was risen he appeared first to Mary-Magdalene." The subsequent appearances are vague and doubtful. Some couldn't recognize him, others thought they had seen a spirit. On the word of Mary Magdalene mainly rests faith in the resurrection. Through her comes that glimpse of the supernatural world under which, for a man like Newman, this world shrivels, and its interests become trivial. Once suppose Mary to have been hysterical, or her vision an illusion of her heart, or her story an affectionate invention to soothe the mother's anguish, and the foundation of Christendom is shaken. Believe her story, and the career of John Henry Newman ceases to be mysterious. What can be more natural than that a man should lose interest in an evanescent and chaotic world when he is assured of presently ascending to one of unfading perfections?

And much more if he is sure assured that a trip amid the world's affairs—the "Prince of this world" being God's Adversary—entanglement in any earthly interest, may result in everlasting damnation. This last reflection comes to me with the first strain of the funeral hymn—*Dies iræ*. A cold horror came on me as I listened to the choir singing those terrors of the dark ages at the funeral of an English scholar. The last time I heard any part of it was in the opera of "Faust," when the devil appropriately utilizes the hymn to terrify poor Margaret in the church. It was to-day sung in Latin, however, and even those who had the prayer-book translation (in which the original is toned down), paid more attention to the singers than to the words. But the barbarism of the hymn was to me almost scandalous, on such an occasion, and I was glad when it was over, and the venerable Cardinal mounted in his pulpit.

I have much respect for Cardinal Manning, on account of his devotion to the welfare of the poor, and his endeavors to reform the drunkards of London. He has not the intellect of Newman, but more humanity. Newman would have no dealings with his heretical brother Francis, giving as his reason, "St. Paul bids us avoid those who cause divisions; you cause divisions; therefore I must avoid you." But Cardinal Manning once invited the writer hereof to his palace, as a London minister to consult about securing purer water for the poor of the city, his interest in humanity overcoming other considerations. To-day it was most impressive to see and hear this aged man (he is over 80) on so solemn and historic an occasion. There was too much in his look and voice to suggest that it might be his last appearance on any occasion of public importance; he held his manuscript near his eyes with both hands, spoke with intervals, and was heard but by few. But there was no sign of decline in what he had said. He spoke with emotion of his sixty years friendship with Newman, but his voice had the old ring of the propagandist when he alluded to the late Cardinal as having ended the "superstition of pride" which once declared "the Catholic religion fit only for weak intellects and unmanly brains." And the aged Cardinal was almost eloquent when he claimed that the universal love and veneration manifested towards Cardinal Newman since his death—a sort of "canonization"—proved the extent to which he had changed the religious thought of England. "An old malevolence has passed into good will."

Cardinal Manning was careful to add, "I will not therefore say that the mind of England has changed." My own conviction is that the mind of England has, indeed, changed, but in a direction the reverse of that in which the Cardinals sought to lead it. The severity towards Dr. Newman forty-five years ago, which the Cardinal calls "malevolence," was due to a public

interest in dogma which is felt no more. Darwinism has had its advent since then. The Englishman of to-day smiles at the Tractarian excitement as a tea-pot tempest. He can now explain Newman, Pusey, and the rest, on principles of "evolution." Men and movements cease to be irritating when they need no more be answered because they are explained. The first heat of the Anglicans against the "perverts" now sounds like the old grammarian's curse—"May God confound thee for thy theory of irregular verbs." Toleration is a symptom of the decline of faith. It is indifference. And the late Cardinal, and his fellow-seceders into Catholicism, did much to promote this decline. Prof. Huxley once made the pregnant remark that "the next best thing to being right is to be clearly and definitely wrong." When Newman, Wiseman, Manning, and others, pressed their dogmatic principles to logical conclusions, the veil of the English temple was rent. Superstition could no more work behind any veil of obscurantism. The church was distinctly divided into "evangelical" and "broad" parties, as to dogma, while ritualism was revived for those who cared more for symbol and sentiment than for theology. The secession ended.

POSITIVE IDEALISM.

BY G. M. M'CRIE.

"I sent my soul throughout Infinity,
Some letter of the after-life to spell;
And by and by my soul [self] returned to me
And answered *I myself* am Heaven and Hell."—OMAR KHAYYAM.

THE tides of philosophic thought are setting towards unity. This tendency, however, though manifesting a unity of aim, does not of itself imply a necessary unity of conclusions. Modern Thought may have Monism in view—almost within sight, but this prospective Monism—the all inclusive generalization which is to blend God, Man, and Nature in one—leans, in the matter of conclusion, to one or more of these three aspects. Hence the so-called Cosmical synthesis is generally either Pantheistic, Idealistic, or Materialistic by preference, being usually a pet concept elevated so as to include less favored ones. But, to borrow an analogy from Physical Science, does it not seem as if the colored, and as it were prejudiced, conception must make way, upon the face of it, for the achromatic and colorless, as the rays of the spectrum blend in the pure white light which is the synthesis of them all?

The various paths by which Monism has been attempted are not without their common difficulties. Appearances, common-sense appearances, do not, at first sight, favor any such formula. Dualism seems so plainly manifest. Long before the date of Reid's dictum "I perceive the external object, and I perceive it to exist," the plainly obvious standpoint had been assumed—the simplest, yet most erroneous of all—that the so-called 'external,' objective, world of nature actually existed 'over against' the subjective spectator, and, this being taken for granted, Man and Nature being, as it were, together in the field, it was easy to cross to the question of origin upon the wing of inference, and to imagine a creative and sustaining Power in whom both alike lived, and moved, and had their being. Yet, though Man and Nature might, in a sense, be classed together as created, there always lay, between the Creator and the created work, the chasm which parts, or seems to part, Infinitude from finitude. The partition between subject and object divided Man from Nature; the void between the finite and the infinite distinguished God from both.

The most notable modern attempt at philosophic unity attacks the first, or subject-object, problem, and, in so doing, indirectly professes to solve the other as well. It is that of the so-called "Neo-Kantian" school of thought, including the late Professor T. H. Green, of Oxford, and M. M. Renouvier and Pillon, among its most prominent representatives.* The leaders of this school are not altogether unanimous in their conclusions. But they agree in this, that, after reconciling the objective world with the subjective spectator, this individual subjective is practically effaced, in favor, with Prof. Green, of an Infinite Consciousness, and, with M. Renouvier and his followers, of "foreign centres of impressions"—other Egos to wit. The point principally noticeable here is, however, their attempted identification of the objective with the subjective. The process is briefly this—borrowing the 'Impressionalism' of David Hume, it is sought, with the aid of the Kantian Category of Relation, to 'constitute' nature by means of something variously entitled "consciousness" or "thought." Matter, perceived or known, consists in "relations between facts in the way of feeling." Nature being thus constituted as a system of relations, and there being nothing outside of consciousness, nothing being ever really present to the mind but its own related impressions, the objective falls into the subjective.

Now, all this has been questioned. It has been demurred to by the Realist, who objects to the disappearance of Nature in the Understanding, and the whole process has been not unjustly described as an argument illegitimately based upon abstractions. It has been urged that the spheres of Knowing and Being have been unwarrantably assumed as coterminous, that the sum of the known has been assigned equal to the sum of the actually existing. By a process of piling up 'feelings,' held together and synthesized by the category of Relation, a Cosmos has, indeed, been con-

*Cf. Green: Introduction to *Prolegomena to Ethics*, Renouvier, *Essai de Critique generale: Traite de Logique generale.* Pillon, *Psychologie de Hume.*

structed, but it is one which bears no provable relation to the universe of existing reality. Consciousness, Thought, Relation, it is said, have been lifted out of their true position which is wholly an abstract one, and have properties assigned to them which really belong only to a conscious *subject*, to a *thinker*, and to a *Relator*. It were easy to rise, as does Prof. Green, from an abstract Thought or Consciousness, 'constituting' Nature, to an Infinite Consciousness in which all finite consciousness is contained, and thus, by slurring over the individual, the personal, subject, in the interests of an Infinite subject-object, to lessen the difficulties of Monistic theorising, but the question arises—is such a solution one which takes into account the elementary realities of Knowledge and Being? And this criticism, so far, is a just one. It would be wholly conclusive on the part of the Realist as against Neo-Kantianism, did not the critic himself fall into something of the same snare. That this is the case may not appear on the surface, but once explained it is just another example of the truth that extremes meet. I perceive and thereby constitute (for my own personal knowledge at least) under the guidance of the category, an object, say a line. This object is, however, in reality, a synthesis of points, points undistinguishable, as such, except in the combination-line. The line is that which I perceive. Thus far both schools of thought agree. But the Realist opposes to this personal constitution of the object—which, with Professor Green and his followers, is its *sole* being*—something else, really an abstraction, which he, (the Realist) calls the actual being of the object as distinguished from its *known* being. This distinction he justifies by the assumption that the work of the mind is "arbitrary and irregularly changeable," not reliable in fact, even as a mirror for the reflection of existing appearances, and he seeks to verify the known result by reference to what he supposes to be actually existing and independent fact, but which is really something wholly in the air. For we must remember that Reality is no independent 'outside' thing, by reference to which, as a standard, the objects constituted by the understanding may be, as it were, checked. The objects thus constituted (not only so far as thought or consciousness is concerned, but in every possible sense, that of origin and persistence included) are *real* and the *only* reality. It is all a question of Cognition and Recognition.† The same thing is (with a modification which we note later on) the "thing" *in the same relations*. Erroneous judgment as to matter of fact is no *un*reality. It is equally existent with the truth. Only, in erroneous judgments, the conditioning relations which go to form the judgment aimed at, or the true judgment, are either wholly different, when the thing is entirely different or another thing, or they are not present in totality. But the conditioning relations are none the less real; as we shall find later on, the relations themselves are the sole reality. The field being wholly occupied by the real there is no room for the intrusion of any 'outside' standard of comparison The real is everything, and, as a concept cannot transcend a percept in the sense of verifying it, any abstraction in the way of an 'outside' and persisting reality can only correspond with what arises within consciousness. There is nothing else from which it can possibly arise.

The common error of these two thought-systems is thus their tendency to abstraction. Prof. Green and his followers lean too exclusively to the abstract view on the *subjective* side, suppressing the individual, personal subject in favor of an abstract "Thought" or "Consciousness," which again resolves into an Infinite Consciousness, not a personal consciousness at all. The other side, ably represented by Professor Veitch of Glasgow University, also follow the abstract path, but mainly on the *objective* side, eschewing as they do the personally-constituted world of nature, and that which constitutes it, to wit the personal relator, in favor of an altogether external conception of that which *is*, called Being—this Being not necessarily corresponding with the known, but transcending it, and superior to it in the sense of being stable and persistent. To the philosophic student the net results of these two speculative systems are reminiscent of the results of Hume's philosophy on the one side, and that of Berkeley on the other. The former eliminated the subjective consciousness, the latter the objective world.

Modern Philosophy, in point of fact, takes refuge in abstractions. The truly concrete is lamely resigned to the modern *savant* whose methods are objective and crudely empirical. A wholly veracious 'outside' world is taken for granted, nothing in the way of philosophic synthesis is attempted, and the resulting conclusions are but those of the specialist. What authority exists for this unnatural divorce of the empirical from the metempirical? Can that which is true in Science be false in Philosophy, or *vice versâ?* The world of Nature, constituted by the understanding, is surely not another sphere from the material world built up of atom and molecule, that the one aspect should be the property of a philosophic caste, the other relegated to a scientific clique. The need of the age is an analysis more profound than any specialist one, and higher than any metaphysical abstraction, and therefore a systhesis more inclusive because univer-

* Cf. Professor Veitch, *Knowing and Being*.

† For a very able statement of this position, on the lines of Positive or Hylo-Idealism, as excogitated by Dr. Robert Lewins, see "Induction and Deduction and other Essays," by the late Miss Constance Naden. (London: Bickers, 1890.)

sal. For the category of relation binds the groupings of carbon compounds no less than the complex web of syllogistic reasoning.

The subject-object puzzle is at the root of this mental-material difficulty. Mental process and its physical concomitant, molecular brain agitation, are popularly voted parallel lines never to meet. True, we are told that "mental and material states may be unified in the individual,"* and the statement is philosophically and scientifically accurate, but how far does this conclusion carry us if the "individual" in question is but the individual of the bodily organism? Only a little way. And then we land in the difficulty of having made understanding issue out of nature, while nature, at the same time, is admittedly forged in the "workshop of imagination." A limited ego, whether it be a mental abstraction or a physical organism, will not serve. Matter constituted by mind, and mind arising as a function of material brain,—these two reciprocally interchangeable will never bring us to unity. Physically, the bodily organism is constantly exchanging particles with its material environment; philosophically, that which is an integral portion of a series cannot synthesize the series which includes itself. Is Dualism then the only conclusion? Not so. Understanding is not swallowed up in nature, nor does nature disappear in understanding. The ego is not the bodily organism alone—a stray momentary grouping of atoms swiftly passing over into its opposite. For this reason that there is *no opposite*. That is the verity of verities, and key to the whole enigma. The true, the only ego, is not the limited self of the bodily organism, but the subject self projected so as to include the objective. It has been the characteristic tendency of certain so-called absolute systems to minimise, if not wholly to discount, the individual subject, to treat the assurance of its self-existence as itself an illusion. In common with many overdrawn speculations, this one has its vestige of truth. The limitary, individual self cannot be found. Never continuing in one stay, neither the philosophic ego, immersed in its own relatively constituted nature, nor the bodily self, whelmed in material flux, can for an instant be isolated or defined. The true ego is not limited but cosmical. We lose the lesser, but to find the greater self—in everything. The thinking subject does not merely codify the manifold into unity; it is the Unity of the Manifold itself.†

It will be evident to the reader that there is, thus, no *septum* between the "thing thought" and the "thing itself," or, as it is more briefly put, in the language of Hylo-Idealism, between "think" and "thing." My conception of the universe, as a system of relations, lies on the same plane as my perception of it as a concourse of atoms. Nay, the conception and the perception are *identical*. A brief examination will make this clear. That a system of relations can form the warp and woof of Being *without* addition of so-called material substance* to form terms for the relation may seem a hard saying. Relations between "viewed objects" are familiar enough. These objects are looked upon as the 'terms' of the relation. A mental bridge of relation popularly spans the gulf between material things. These material things are supposed to have 'body' or 'content'—the mental to have none. Hence, on the physical plane, it is urged that the theoretically indivisible atom must have content (which is contradictory as it would then have at least top and bottom, hence divisible) and cannot possibly be a mere mathematical point, "having position but not magnitude," on the ground that out of nothing nothing comes, and that multiplication of *o* by any number produces only *o* as result. Similarly it is contended, on the mental plane, that no conceivable number of "empty" relations—that is relations without content or terms—can ever evolve related things. But there is really no more ground for positing 'things' as *termini* for relations than there is for ascribing 'content' to ultimate atoms.

The word "relation" in its every day, secondary, sense applies, indeed, to a connection, analogical or otherwise, between terms, but these 'terms' are only unanalysed relations in turn, and the content apparent in them is only that of regress of relations. The link is everything, the term nothing. Relation is thus no abstraction of the sequence, or coexistence of concrete things, it is the very thing itself, to add to which a wholly unnecessary and contradictory 'content' is to multiply first principles without necessity, and to perpetrate a fallacy akin to that of Animism, introducing an element unwarranted by the conditions of the problem. The one indispensable element of relation is not content, but a *relator* in the relation. Without a relator the whole edifice of relation falls instantly. This relator is "for" the related, and *vice versâ;* there is no partition, or otherwise than a relational distinction between them. Relation, which is all and everything, includes relator and related.

True Idealism is therefore *positive*. The stable and certain ground which bears our individual weight and constitutes the individual self, is a system of relations. From this point of view, the purely empirical method on the one hand, and the purely abstract on the other, are seen to be not merely half-truths, but essentially misleading in character as introducing a vi-

* W. B. McTaggart—"Absolute Relativism."

† "As the world is to each man as it affects him: to each a different world" [G. H. Lewes]. so every one constitutes his own system of relations, to each a different system, to be construed rightly or wrongly, perfectly or imperfectly, (but always really and truly) as the case may be.

* "Substance" in common language, but more properly "body."

cious issue. Empiricism illegitimately contributes material content, or terms having content, to simple relation.* Abstractionalism adds an unnecessary principle in the way of A-gnosis, an unknowable, absolute, or unrelated something to that which needs no such supplement, indeed negatives it. Hence the conclusion is an egoistic relator, part and parcel of the relational Cosmos egoistically constituted. Microcosm and Macrocosm are but Auto-cosm. All else is Dualism. This is Monism.

THE ORIGIN OF REASON.

THE ASSUMPTIONS INVOLVED IN NOIRE'S THEORY.

BY T. BAILEY SAUNDERS, M. A. (OXON.)

(CONCLUDED.)

Noiré's theory consists in recognizing and applying to the question of the genesis of distinctively human faculties, the broad result of philological analysis, namely, that the simplest elements of language are conceptual signs. Now, these conceptual signs cannot have come into existence at all except in direct connection with some particular acts or objects, for the simple reason that all our knowledge, though not entirely derivable from sensuous experience, is ultimately concerned with it. What particular acts or objects, then, would be most likely, by their very nature, to supply the conditions for the rise of concepts, and at one and the same time to call forth the sign which is not only their manifestation but their very essence? Those, said Noiré, which involve common creative labor, acts in which several would join at once for the purpose of doing something together, acts such as digging, striking, weaving, in which the product of common labor would be seen growing under the very labor itself, and would be intuitively recognized as the result of common action. No acts would be so likely as these, concluded Noiré, to render inevitable what is the essence of conceptual thought, a consciousness of the manifold as one; and since it is characteristic of men engaged in a common work to relieve their feelings and stimulate their efforts by the utterance of cries, these cries would tend to become associated with the labor and with the product of it. Cries like these would have a predicative meaning, that is to say, they would bind together the activity itself and the result of the activity; and as at the beginning no distinction would have been made between the subject and the object of the work, the cry would be the simplest element of thought, a sentence-word, a conceptual sign.

And Noiré went further asserting that a sentence-word thus formed would arise under ideal and universal conditions. By this he meant that the whole process and every part of it would be an act of *will*, issuing in particular sensuous experiences, some temporal, some spacial, some causal. The cry, for instance, is a particular sensuous experience, audible and temporal in its nature; the object produced is another particular sensuous experience, existing in space and visible; the activity is intuitively recognized as something causal; and all three are acts of will, and acts of will undertaken in common with others and followed by a common result. The manifold of all these sensuous experiences or presentations is brought together, by an ideal intuition, under one unifying sign, the cry which accompanies the work; a cry uttered by all, understood by all, the repetition of which would mean that the whole process is reproducible at will. Here then, said Noiré, is the origin of a true linguistic sign, a manifestation of the logos.

Now there are, unfortunately for the validity of the theory, two assumptions on which it rests, one of which certainly destroys it as a possible explanation of the *origin* of mind. It is quite true that no theory can afford to dispense with assumptions; but it is also true that no theory is worth anything which presupposes the existence of that of which it seeks to show the origin. Noiré's two assumptions are these: the existence of the social instinct, and the presence of what he calls 'ideal intuition'.

The social instinct, by which is here meant the tendency of primitive men to work together towards a common end, is not the exclusive characteristic of the *genus homo;* as has been previously remarked, it is an ordinary feature in the life of many of the lower animals. The social instinct cannot operate either amongst the lower animals or in man, without the existence of some sort of intelligible signs, not necessarily linguistic or audible. If the existence of the social instinct were the only assumption on which Noiré's whole theory were based, there would be no ground for restricting the first appearance of *reason* to the *genus homo*. Noiré is forced to do so, in spite of the character of this assumption, because he further assumes that reason is impossible without speech—an hypothesis which may be true, though at present it is safe to say that opinions are not entirely in favor of its validity.

However difficult it may be to pronounce upon the exact part which, in Noiré's theory, is to be assigned to the social instinct, there can be little doubt that the second assumption is quite destructive of the value of the theory as an account by the *origin of reason*. It must be obvious at once that *an ideal intuition* is the very process which has to be explained, and that to

* Relation, *pur et simple*, being instinct throughout, really corresponds most closely with the purely scientific modern definition of matter, not as organic and inorganic, but as Büchner puts it, "instinct throughout with the most shining life." An atomic cosmos cannot be thus alive—its atoms cannot be activity themselves, but only *centres* of activity. Mutually attractive atoms are inconceivable as implying a thing acting where it is *not*.

assume it as part of the agency which gives rise to concepts is to argue in a circle. What is an ideal intuition, coming into play in the origin of concepts, if it is not that binding and separating force of the mind which penetrates through sensuous experience to underlying unity? This binding and separating force is a mental process, let us admit, which only manifests itself in the concept, and then only in and through a sign; but it is logically prior to the concept. In Noiré's explanation its existence is confessedly assumed; and so we are forced to the conclusion that the theory offers no real explanation of the rise of conceptual thought.

Now Professor Max Müller, the advocate of this theory, is very frank in his avowal of sympathy with the historical as opposed to the theoretical treatment of these questions,* and consequently when he applies the Historical Method to an inquiry into the origin of concepts, he is evidently justified in asserting that in such and such conditions may probably be found their origin. By 'origin,' however, he must here mean 'first manifestation,' origin in the historical sense; he cannot mean origin in the theoretical sense, that which was not a concept, but out of which concepts developed. We may, it is true, speak of a spring as the *fons et origo* of a river; but we must go behind the spring to find out the real source from which the river flows.

To conclude, it is doubtful whether any real explanation of conceptual thought, any explanation, that is, which does not involve an argument in a circle, can ever be possible; and of this doubt Noiré's attempt is a striking confirmation. Into any theoretical definition some such term as *intuition* is sure to be introduced; or, in other words, an explanation of the processes of the mind ultimately made to rest on something without which thought is impossible, some condition precedent to all experience. This is just the very characteristic of the mind which is all-important, and which cannot be explained.

The first dawn of conceptual thought, the first germ of the logos, these and similar expressions can be taken, as far as Noiré's theory is concerned, only in the sense that this is the furthest we can get back in the inquiry. What has to be explained, what Mr. Romanes and others maintain that they do explain, is not so much the dawn of conceptual thought, as the light which makes the dawn, conceptual thought, the act of ideal intuition, itself; how this could have been developed, and was developed out, of something below it in the hierarchy of psychical phenomena. If Noiré's theory is put forward as a solution of that problem, as an explanation of that difficulty, it is a solution which itself requires to be solved. Perhaps we shall never arrive at a satisfactory solution. But in acknowledging that the difficulty still remains, in spite of all that has been written on the matter, it would be untrue to go further and maintain that nothing has been done towards removing it; for even a clear statement of the difficulty is a step in advance. So much, at any rate, has been already achieved. Zoology has taught us how small is the structural difference between man and his alleged simian ancestors, and psychologists have made clear in what his mental superiority consists. We know where we are, and what it is exactly which has not yet been explained.

* "Natural Religion," p. 212.

THE AFRO-AMERICAN AS HE IS.

BY T. THOMAS FORTUNE.*

It is unfortunate for any country to have a race question. It is doubly unfortunate for the race which is the bone of contention. And, yet, it is a fact that few countries, ancient or modern, have been without such a question at some stage of their history. The Jewish question in Germany, the Irish question in Great Britain, and the African question in the United States sufficiently illustrate and enforce my observation, as it applies to the social, economic and political condition of affairs in the countries affected to-day. The question of race has consumed more of the attention of those governments, of their men of thought, and been productive of more expenditure of vital and material resource than all other questions combined. In each instance the argument ranking all others has been, that the offending minority race was of inferior origin, alien character, and unassimilable; and in each instance the argument was speculative rather than positive as to the major premise.

The argument of fundamental and ineradical inferiority of mental and physiological properties cannot be safely lodged against any race, simply because no civilized race to-day but must pause dumbfounded in the presence of the historical fact that it was a savage before it was a civilized people. What one race has accomplished, given similar environment, opportunity, and length of time, another race can accomplish, unless we reject the doctrine of the unity of the human family and the fatherhood of God, evidences of the verity of the former being too numerous to admit of disputation, however the latter may gyrate in the nimbus of dogmatic contention. The physical and mental properties of the lowest and the highest form of man are so unmistakably similar as to establish beyond the possibility of successful contradiction the original oneness of the race. If it had a common origin, the differences apparent in the variant tribes

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are necessarily adventitious rather than germinal, in so far as they relate to mental and physiological growth or ungrowth. We must therefore look to other than radically fundamental strength on the one hand and weakness on the other for an explanation of the superiority of European over Asiatic growth, and of the latter over that of African growth. While Europeans owe a great deal to climate, they owe vastly more to their contiguity one with another, the interchange of ideas and of the products of industry, and the friction consequent on the life and death competition produced by these. Isolate any one of the strong governments of Europe to-day, as Africa has been isolated, and its people would by the natural law relapse into savagery and possibly become extinct in the course of the ages. The interminable conflicts of the three distinct peoples of the British Islands did more to develope the British character of to-day than any other influence, the contiguity of the continent of Europe not excepted.

The African problem in the United States, like the Irish problem in Great Britain, has for more than a hundred years been a cause of furious contention, and is no less so to-day than it was in the beginning, albeit it has assumed an almost entirely different phase to that which confronted the earlier statesmen of the Republic. We have long since passed beyond the sentimental phase of it around which the hosts of Anti-Slavery gathered. We have left the battle ground of slave versus free labor. That this is true indicates progress. We now stand upon the ground of rational, humane discussion of the Afro-American's right and capacity to be recognized as a coequal force in our heterogenous population. Does he possess the qualities which are necessary to make a good citizen? Is he qualified as a freeman to maintain his position in the fierce and unnatural competition incident to our civilization, in which the brutality of the savage has given place to the savage cunning of the brute, in which self preservation has been deified as the mam mon of unrighteousness, and the devil take the hindmost has become the ruling passion in the great scramble for something to eat and to wear? These are the phases of the question now to be considered and answered.

In several numbers of the *The Open Court*, Professor E. D. Cope has labored to establish the negative side of the proposition here laid down; but, it seems to me, that he knows vastly more about the Negroes in Africa than he does about those in the United States; more about the "black savages" of the "Dark Continent," than about the black and colored people of the United States, who are as far from being savages as their African ancestors, in the main, were from being civilized, a fact utterly ignored by Professor Cope, but which was very plainly perceived and set forth by Mr. Staniland Wake. For instance, Professor Cope states his position as follows (*The Open Court*, No. 146):

"I repeat again what appears to me to be the facts of the case. The characteristics of the Negro-mind are of such a nature as to unfit him for citizenship in this country. He is thoroughly superstitious, and absolutely under the control of supernaturalism, in some generally degrading form, and the teachers of it. He is lacking in rationality and morality. Without going further these traits alone should exclude him from citizenship. Secondly, these peculiarities depend on an organic constitution which it will require ages to remove. Corresponding qualities in the lower strata of the white race are modified or removed in a comparatively short time, on account of superior natural mental endowment. Thirdly, if he remains in this country he will mix with the whites until in half a century or less, there will not be a person of pure Negro blood in it. It follows from this that there will be, in accordance with the usual amount of increase, an immense population of mulattoes, where there should be an equal number of whites. The deteoriation thus resulting would be disastrous on our intellectual and moral, and consequently on our political, prosperity."

To this Mr. Wake replies (*The Open Court*, No. 148):

"It may be regarded as an absolute certainty. And the very fact that he has had a longer period in which to improve than any other race, and yet has failed to do so, is no discredit to the African. For, through the whole long series of ages he has been subjected to climatic and other influences which have not only hampered him in the race of life, but have absolutely prevented any improvement. Remove these influences and replace them with others fitted for progress, and there is no reason in the organic constitution of the Negro why he should not in the course of a few generations improve in his mental organization, so as to be quite as well fitted to exercise the functions of citizenship as a large number of the white inhabitants of the United States. I have seen it stated that the Negro of this country shows in his physical structure an improvement over his imported ancestors. The mental improvement which accompanies the progress of education, and the constant association with the white race, must be attended with improved physical development."

Professor Cope will have some small difficulty in establishing the soundness of his statement that the Afro-American "is thoroughly superstitious, and absolutely under the control of supernaturalism in some generally degrading form, and the teachers of it." I

challenge the Professor to produce his proofs in substantiation of this sweeping indictment. I maintain that the reverse, while not wholly is relatively true. I maintain that the Afro-Americans are, as a whole more devout and rational than the generality of white persons about them, especially the lower class, if there can be any lower class where such a woful lack of moral elevation of character is to be found among a class of whites. "He is lacking in rationality and morality," may be disposed of in like manner. Professor Cope evidently does not know anything whatever of the irrational and immoral character of the poor whites of the Southern States. The superstitious practices ascribed to Afro-Americans have never been observed by me, and I was born and reared among these people. And I challenge Professor Cope to cite an authenticated case of such practices among these people. The blacks of the South sustain more churches than the whites do, and they are more devout, after a fashion, than the whites are. And, yet, neither the one nor the other stand upon the high rational and moral ground we could wish them to. Their religious professions and practices are of a crude nature and their morality is still too largely in the primitive state.

When he apprehends that a century hence the Afro-Americans will be a race of mulattoes, "where there should be an equal number of whites," Professor Cope forgets that it takes two to make a bargain, and that under existing social and civil laws, the result that vexes his soul cannot be accomplished except by the moral obtuseness on the part of the whites, men and women, which he ascribes to the blacks. Is not the receiver of stolen goods as bad as the thief? Even so? But Professor Cope need not lose his appetite for fear that this apparition will appear before him as his imagination conjures it. If the Afro-American were the degraded creature he conceives him he would have something to fear. But, being false in one thing, he is very largely false in all. The fact is that Afro-American women are ceasing more and more to submit to being the convenience for white men. They are developing the self-respect Professor Cope presumes they are absolutely devoid of, and are reducing every year in that way the crop of mulattoes. They will continue to decrease, until the unnatural barriers to the consummation of legal unions are removed.

I maintain that the Afro-American is no more to be compared to the original batch of Africans forced into this country than the present inhabitants of New England are to be compared to the pilgrims who discharged themselves out of the Mayflower onto Plymouth Rock. They have been two hundred years on the continent, and will be here when Gabriel sounds the bugle call for the nations of the earth to stand forth to be judged according to the deeds done in the flesh. They are not going to Africa, as Professor Cope thinks they should, nor to the West Indies as Mr. Wakeman thinks it well that they should do, and for the sufficient reason that they are very well satisfied right where they are.

The progress the Afro-American has made since his manumission in all the relations of our civilization is a sufficient answer to all the objections to his presence urged by Professor Cope and manfully combatted by Mr. Wake. The limitations of this article will not permit me to discuss his moral, religious, civil and material development; but enough has been said to show that there is more than one side to this as to most questions.

FAIRY TALES AND THEIR IMPORTANCE.

I FIND in No. 156 of *The Open Court* a vigorous appeal of Mr. Rood to do away with ogres and fairies, lest the imagination of our children should be poisoned by unreal and fictitious ideas. Mr. C. Staniland Wake has answered Mr. Rood, and calling attention to the educatory influence of fairy tales, admonishes us not to be in too great a hurry to do away with ogres and fairies. The subject is of great practical importance and a few words of consideration, which suggested themselves to me on the perusal of the articles, may not be inappropriate.

Mr. Rood takes the ground that everything unreal is untrue; therefore it is obnoxious and should not be allowed to be instilled into the minds of children. I recognize as good the principle of removing everything untrue from our plan of education. The purpose of education is to make children fit for life, and one indispensable condition is to teach them truth, wherever we are in possession of truth; and, what is more, to teach them the method how to arrive at truth, how to criticise propositions, wherever we have not as yet arrived at a clear and indisputable statement of truth.

Allowing that fairy tales are unreal and may lead the imagination of children astray: are they for this very reason untrue? Do they not contain truths of great importance, which it is very difficult to teach children otherwise than in the poetic shape of fairy tales? I believe this is the reason why in spite of so much theoretical antagonism to fairy tales they have practically never been, and perhaps never will be, removed from our nurseries. There are no witches who threaten to abuse the innocence of children, and there are no fairies to protect them. But are there not impersonal influences abroad that act as if they were witches, and are there not also some almost unaccountable conditions in the nature of things that we meet often in the course of events, but which act as if they were good fairies to protect children (and no less the adult children of nature called men,) in dangers

which surround them everywhere, and of which they are not always conscious?

Science will at a maturer age explain such mysteries, it will reveal to the insight of a savant that which is a marvelous miracle to the childish conception of an immature observation. But so long as our boys and girls are not born as savants, they have to pass through the period of childhood, they have to develop by degrees and have to assimilate the facts of life, they have to acquire truth in the way we did, when we were children, as the race did, when humanity was in a state of helpless childhood still.

Did not religion also come to us in the form of a fairy tale? And is not a great truth contained in the legend of Christianity? The belief in the fairy tale will pass away, but the truth will remain.

The development of children, it has been observed, is a short repetition of the development of the race. Will it be advisable to suppress that stage in which the taste for fairy tales is natural? Is not a knowledge of legends, fairy tales, and sagas an indispensable part of our education, which, if lacking, will make it impossible to understand the most common place allusions in popular authors? Our art galleries will become a book with seven seals to him who knows nothing about the labors of Hercules or the Gods of Olympus. Will you compensate the want of an acquaintance with our most well-known legends, sagas, and characters of fiction at a later period, when the taste for such things has passed away?

I met once an otherwise well-educated lady who did not know who Samson was. An allusion to Samson's locks had no meaning to her, for she had enjoyed a liberal education; her parents being freethinkers, she had never read the Bible and knew only that the Bible was an old-fashioned work, chiefly of old Hebrew literature, which she supposed was full of contradictions and without any real value.

A total abolition of fairy tales is not only inadvisable, but will be found to be an impossibility. There are certain classical fairy tales, sagas, and legends, which have contributed to the ethical, religious, and even scientific formation of the human mind. Thus not only many stories in the Old and the New Testament, but also Homer, Hesiod, and many German and Arabian fairy tales have become an integral part of our present civilization. We cannot do away with them without at the same time obliterating the development of most important ideas. Such fairy tales teach us the natural growth of certain moral truths in the human mind. These moral truths were comprehended first symbolically and evolved by and by into a state of rational clearness.

I do *not* propose to tell children lies, to tell them stories about fairies and ogres and to make them believe these stories. Children, having an average intelligence, will never believe the stories, however much they may enjoy them. The very question: Is that really true? repeated perhaps by every child, betrays their critical mind. Any one who would answer, "Of course, every word is literally true," would be guilty of implanting an untruth in the young minds of our children. We must not suppress but rather develop the natural tendency of criticism.

While we cannot advise the doing away with fairy tales, we can very well suggest that the substance of them may be critically revised, that superfluous matter may be removed and those features only retained that are inspiring and instructive. P. C.

A VISIT TO JOLIET.

A FEW WORDS ABOUT THE ANARCHISTS.

A few days ago I visited the penitentiary at Joliet where the warden kindly permitted me to see the institution. One of the officers, Mr. Gallus Muller, a gentleman excellently informed, not only about penal science generally, but also about the many details of the discipline and management of the prison, acted as guide and gave me valuable information.

I do not intend here to give an account of all the incidents of my visit, but I believe it will be of general interest to say a few words about the so-called anarchists confined in Joliet. I met two of them incidentally—Schwab and Neebe; but Fielden I did not see. He was, for some reason unknown to me, absent from the place where he usually works.

The warden had told me that the much talked of Anarchists were a great deal more harmless than was generally believed. They had never as yet infringed upon any of the prison rules and proved to be very tractable.

Oscar Neebe was employed as a hospital attendent. He gives the impression of a vigorous character and shows much intelligence. I enjoyed a talk with him of about twenty minutes. He reported his experiences with his fellow prisoners. He had tried to exercise a moral influence upon one of them—a thief convicted for a second time, who had acted more from moral weakness than from evil intention—a case very common among criminals. We also discussed the labor problem and he grew warm on the subject, but without excess and without the least revengeful feeling. Speaking of the Haymarket meeting at which he was not present, he said that some "crank" must have thrown the bomb. At my suggestion whether that crank might not have been Ling, he replied that he did not know, as he had not been an acquaintance of Ling's until they met in prison, and Ling had impressed his fellow-prisoners as a man mentally unbalanced.

I found Schwab in the prison library where he is engaged as book-binder. Schwab is a good-natured, simple-minded fellow, with a taste for reading and study. There is no possible danger in having him at large. There is a touch of idealism in his character, and it is this ideal trait which inveigled him into what he now confesses to have been rash and inconsiderate speeches.

Both Neebe and Schwab told me that they were well treated and had no complaint to make against the officers of the prison.

A movement for the pardon of Neebe is being advocated by many influential men who have no sympathy with anarchism. It is to be hoped that the movement will be successful and that such a harmless man as Michael Schwab will not be forgotten.

P. C.

CORRESPONDENCE.

A LAST WORD ABOUT OLD CHIVALRY.

ANSWER TO GENERAL TRUMBULL.

To the Editor of The Open Court:—

It would take up too much room minutely to answer the courteous reply of General Trumbull. I beg to present a few short remarks only.

I am glad to see that the divergence of opinion between my opponent and myself is after all less radical than superficial. General Trumbull seems to have, at the bottom, a correct estimate of the real character of chivalry when he says: "Chivalry as a sentiment was humane. . . . . the standard of chivalry was morally high," . . . . nothing truer could be written. On this fundamental and essential point we are then in perfect accord.

The personal conduct of the old Knights, not Chivalry, is then that which awakens the ardent opposition of my opponent. Let us see if that opposition is really just. Certainly there were bad Knights—

> "*Chevaliers félons et méchants*
> *Qui tramaient des complots malfaisants,*"

Everybody knows that. But that proves nothing against chivalry and the good Knights any more than the escape to-day of rascally cashiers into Canada, proves against the honesty of banks and of faithful cashiers.

But even the conduct of honest Knights, "*Sans peur et sans reproche,*" is very severely judged by General Trumbull. He perhaps accepts too easily the facts as written by prejudiced and biased writers, or he forgets to take into account the times, ideas, customs and general conditions among which lived and acted these ancient good Knights. This necessarily perverts my candid opponent's judgment. Exactly as if the General visiting the Institute of Fine Arts, of Chicago, commenced by studying and admiring the exquisite American statue of John Harvard, after that forever and inflexibly to carry with him this same artistic modern standard of beauty, to apply it to, and judge by it, the great master pieces of Egyptian, Greek, and Roman statuary.

Before all it is necessary to remember that chivalry and the Knights belonged not to the old Roman civilization, refinement and decrepitude. They sprang from that young, rude, healthy and generous German barbarism by which western Europe has been renovated and rejuvenated. To it the foremost nations of this day, including North America, are indebted for their vigorous mentality, love of truth and liberty. Why can we not be a little more indulgent for the "barbarism" of the rude, impulsive old Knights, when we ourselves, in this very century, still possess so strong a flavor of that blunt barbarism, that more supple and polished Italians, when among themselves, designate us—Americans, English, Germans and French—as "the barbarians."

Old Knights were illiterate, as remarks General Trumbull, but they were nevertheless thinkers and strong thinkers too. Charlemagne, the author of the "Capitulaires," could neither read nor write, he signed parchments by striking on them the mark of the pommel of his sword.

I am not an enemy of business or trade. I do not underrate its necessity, but I object to its ever increasing obtrusiveness. Business absorbs every day more and more all the energy and thought of mankind, crowding everything else to the wall. It was not by an "aristocratic" prejudice that deep meaning old mythology gave the same god, Mercury, to the robber and to the merchant it was because they both seek to prey on others by sharp, cunning, to possess themselves of riches sowed and harvested by the labor of others, without an equivalent, or any work of their own.

If General Trumbull will study comparatively antique statuary, he will soon distinguish the different characters of the different ideals, that of Mercury from those of nobler deities. As long as something better, more just, is not found to replace it, trade is necessary, but it is none the less a "legal robbery combined with gambling"—a robbery in the economical sense of the word only, and it is, of course, *objectively* only and not *subjectively* that an honest merchant is a "robber."

If, to judge well of past centuries, to understand correctly their institutions and men, it is *absolutely* necessary to study them with archeological knowledge and tact—without any anachronistic thought or standard— to transport ourselves into the very midst of these old centuries and to breathe their ancient atmosphere, it is not the less necessary, on the other hand, when desiring to understand correctly and judge of our own times and customs, to recede from them, to seek the correct point of view, as when studying a work of art. Viewed from too far or too near, nothing can properly be seen and understood.

I entertain not the least doubt that if General Trumbull will only take the trouble to step a little closer to old chivalrous ages, and a little farther from our modern mercantile, feverish competitive society, I shall have the pleasure of seeing his sober judgment in perfect accord, not with the few detractors of old chivalry, but with the great historians and poets who have extolled it, nay with the unanimous judgment of the civilized nations, among whom to say of a man and of his actions that they are "chivalrous," is the very highest praise that can be made of them.

F. DE GISSAC.

FATALISM AND DETERMINISM.

To the Editor of The Open Court:—

In your issue of August 21st, Dr. Montgomery says:

"You set out to defend some kind of preconceived faith; for instance, a belief in the existence of an evolution-governing, god-like 'All,' and—against your strongest convictions on the other side—you will find yourself inextricably involved in pure Fatalism, the deadliest of all creeds."

To assert that there is "an evolution-governing godlike All," does really land us into the arms of "pure Fatalism"; but instead of fatalism being "the deadliest of all creeds," it is really the deadliest foe of all creeds, for it unmistakably forces us to take an invulnerable position upon the Monistic Rock of Ages. The demonstration of Monism is not complete without Fatalism. By Monism all things have their roots in one—in the "All"—just the same as all kinds of vegetation have their roots in the earth. Fatalism, Monism and Evolution are bound together by ties which no logic can sever. Evolution has nothing to do with the false doctrine of the hereditary transmission of acquired faculties, neither has Monism. From the Evolution-Monistic standpoint, all faculties are evolved. The doctrine of acquired faculties is synonymous with the religious doctrine of free-will, and as long as men of science indulge in it they will be in a straight betwixt two and a reason cannot be securely enthroned. If things are evolved they cannot logically be acquired, and if Monism is true then Fatalism is a fact. The tallest tree does not acquire its height, the brightest orb its lustre, the costliest gem its value, the hardest rock its hardness, the swiftest animal its swiftness, nor the most moral man his morality. All these are evolutions of the "All"—the fruits of fate, and from no other basis of reasoning can true Monism be successfully defended. The united testimony of Nature in every domain is, that all great things do not come by acquirement; they are evolutions of that Power which resides in matter. What men call acquirements are simply the results of the operation of the power which is continually at work in all organisms and environments. Character is not acquired any more than form is—any more than youth and old age are. The beasts do not acquire their specific and peculiar vicious characteristics, then why should that charge be laid at the door of man?

I respectfully say to Dr. Montgomery that the Fatalism which he so seemingly abhors will yet become the head of the scientific corner—not that Fatalism which teaches men to sit and wait, but that which teaches of that Power which forces mankind to better conditions and states. JOHN MADDOCK.

[We distinguish between Fatalism and Determinism. That view which Mr. Maddock calls Fatalism, viz, that everything is determined by law is usually called Determinism. Fatalism is that kind of Determinism which overlooks that the acting individual is also a factor by which its fate is determined. Fatalism (not as presented by Mr. Maddock), but as it is usually understood, is indeed, as Dr. Montgomery says, "the deadliest of all creeds." If the Mussulman breaks his leg, he does not send to a physician to replace and cure the fracture; he says: "It is my kismet that I broke my leg, and if Allah wishes to cure the fracture he will cure it whether or not a physician is called for."—ED.]

BOOK REVIEWS.

PHILOSOPHY IN HOMŒOPATHY. By *Charles S. Mack*, M. D. Chicago: Gross & Delbridge.

We have here an Essay on Homœopathy that treats of the question *Similia Similibus Curantur?* with certain introductory matter, the most important of which consists of two lectures on homœopathy as the only system of curative medicine. The subsequent part of the book contains a practical address to some students in the Department of Medicine and Surgery of the University of Michigan, in answer to certain written questions. Such a book as this could not be properly reviewed without entering into the discussion between the homœopathists and their opponents. This would be out of place in the pages of *The Open Court*, but we may give a quotation from Dr. Mack's Essay to show what is called the philosophy of homœopathy. After drawing an analogy between disease and moral evil, and referring to a Primal Source of health and goodness, it is said, "if these beliefs are correct, man to be radically reformed, must confess his sins: the strength to shun the evils to which he inclines, and the goodness which replaces in him the evils from which he is radically reformed must come from the Prime Source of good. A recognition of this dependence and a confession of sins are essentials of prayer. It seems as if one does in taking a homœopathic drug that which is analogous to confessing a sin." We have heard of the power of faith in connection with the administration of physic, and if confession of sins is to be added, the healing art will again become as it was in the primitive age of Christianity, a function of the priest! Fittingly this book, which is addressed to the General Reader as well as to the Medical Professor, ends with an appendix containing two articles reprinted from "The New-Jerusalem Magazine," which refer to applications of certain ideas of Emmanuel Swedenborg. Ω.

THE ALADDIN OVEN. By *Edward Atkinson*. Boston, Mass.

This little pamphlet of fifty-seven pages is the description of a fuel and food saving oven, invented by Mr. Edward Atkinson of Boston. It is also a cookery book to correspond with the principle of the oven. In the field of Political Economy, Mr. Atkinson has obtained celebrity, not only for the logic of his argument and his mastery of statistics, but also for the charm of his literary style, and his ethical treatment of what is erroneously supposed to be nothing but the mercenary science of self-interest.

Mr. Atkinson, not satisfied with the fame he has achieved in helping to raise Political Economy to the plane of moral science, proposes to elevate Kitchen Economy to the same level. Excepting rare old Burton, who died a quarter of a thousand years ago, there is no man more competent than Mr. Atkinson to show the intimate relations between food and morals, cookery and religion, the ailments of the body and the ailments of the mind. In Mr. Atkinson's theology, there is more grace in the sacrament of bread, when the bread is made of good flour and well baked, than when it is not. Although to the unenlightened vision roast beef appears to be of the earth earthy, a minister unto the corporeal senses only, Mr. Atkinson believes in the spirituality of a tender sirloin, if it be well done; but not otherwise. He also believes that it is not only wise but virtuous to save every atom of the Creator's bounty, and that waste is wickedness.

If, as the ancient legend has it, he is a benefactor who maketh two blades of grass to grow where only one did grow before, so equally is he who maketh a ton of coal do double duty, and who teaches how from a single ration of flour, to make a double ration of bread. Mr. Atkinson does not claim to do exactly that, but he does claim to make a great saving in the cost of the kitchen, and in the labor of the cook. In a word the dual principle of Mr. Atkinson's oven is "economy of fuel, and economy of food material"; and he claims that by his invention he has realized this double saving. In support of his claim he presents many enthusiastic testimonials from reliable persons who have tried the Aladdin oven. Laying aside all sentiment and metaphysics, and reducing the argument to a practical problem of dollars and cents, Mr. Atkinson says: "At the present price of flour, family bread can be made in this way, at a cost for the materials and the fuel of less than two and a half cents per pound of bread."

Irritated and annoyed by the expensive loss of caloric resulting from the ordinary methods of cooking food, Mr. Atkinson applied his genius to the invention of an oven which would "*first catch the heat, and then convert it into work without waste.*" This oven appears to be a cupboard with shelves in it, the whole made of iron properly lined, so as to preserve for any length of time the exact temperature necessary to cook the food placed upon the shelves, no more, no less; and to cook it in such a way that the flavor of each particular article shall be preserved. In one oven, Mr. Atkinson triumphantly cooked at the same time, steak, chicken, potatoes, rice pudding, and soda biscuit, in such a manner that the flavor of one was not given to the other; and "the reason why many kinds of food can be cooked in the same oven at the same time is because the heat is not raised to so high a point as to distil the juices or dissociate the fats; therefore there is little or no smell and no loss of flavor by distillation."

The fuel for the Aladdin oven is gas or kerosene oil, burned in a lamp so constructed that by the easy process of raising or lowering the wick, the precise degree of heat required is obtained. Mr. Atkinson cooked last summer for a family of ten persons, and he estimated the cost of fuel per meal to be about a quarter of a cent. While the rest of us may not be able to economise with like success, there can be no doubt that the cost of cooking by the Aladdin oven must be very much less than by the ordinary iron stove, while it must be easier to regulate the heat in the oven than in the stove. Mr. Atkinson's comparison between those instrumentalities of cooking may be stated in his own words: "The difficulties in the use of the common stove or range consist in the varying degree of heat, which is due to the fact that the combustion of coal cannot be controlled with any certainty; whereas very simple instructions in the application of heat from a lamp or gas burner in the Aladdin oven will suffice, because with a given lamp and an oven of given capacity the degree of heat is under absolute control."

It is with the ethical and religious character of this invention that we are most concerned. When we remember how greatly temper influences conduct, and think how the perversities of the ordinary cooking stove provoke nervous irritability, spite, and sometimes desperate profanity in the cook, what a beneficent moral agent is a cooking apparatus that cares nothing about the draft, nor whether the wind is east or west; that has no sullen spells, refusing to burn sufficiently at one time, and savagely burning too

much at another; that asks no aid from kindling-wood, but lights up instantaneously, and is willing to quit burning as soon as its work is done! And when we reflect upon the sins that spring from dyspepsia alone, how can we sufficiently reward the missionary who comes to our heathen kitchens with an oven capable of "rendering food material fit for consumption in the most nutritious way"! Digestion converts bread born of the ground, into thought, conduct, principle, and makes them good or bad. There is much useful information and philosophy in Mr. Atkinson's pamphlet outside his explanation of the oven, and no doubt he would gladly send it to any person sufficiently interested in the subject to write to him for it. M. M. T.

On the Relative Advantage of Tubs with Bottoms and Tubs Without. Being a Rambling Letter from a Cooper's Apprentice to a Swedenborgian Clergyman. New York: Printed for the author; 20 Cooper Union.

This is written first of all for Swedenborgians, and then for those who take an interest in knowing the views entertained by the eccentric Swede on the relation of man to the universe. Regarded from this point of view, the Cooper's Apprentice has furnished a very thoughtful work, although it is hardly one which *The Open Court* can endorse as a statement of scientific truth. The author says in his *Fore-word*, "illiterate people do not lose their thought in words; they think by *things*, i. e., by visible mental pictures. But men of letters, if they are not at the same time men of a practical and, I may say, mechanical turn of mind, rarely think by mental pictures, but mostly by words, and they lose their thought in words, and are unable to think with coherence" upon the fundamental subjects treated of by Swedenborg, "because these subjects are deep—deeper than Thought for the most part—deep as Fact itself." We have here a reason why such subjects require for their comprehension minds of a mystical temperament, minds that do not seek for scientific proof, but have a ground of reason and fact of their own. It is certainly amusing to find men of thought being charged with want of coherence because they use words instead of mental pictures. If the author had shown a little more thought in supplying his book with a table of contents, its value from a purely material standpoint would have been considerably added to. Ω

The Criterion Monthly Magazine, of which we have received the first number, is published at Chicago, and is in fact the former amateur paper *Germania*, under a new name. The articles in the present number are well written and are apparently all by ladies. The most important are "Bayard Taylor as a Poet," by Fannie Kemble Johnson, and "Influence of Germany upon Modern Thought," by Caroline K. Sherman. Amateur journalism is to be a special feature of the magazine, and this alone ought to secure it a successful career.

NOTES.

It is intended to make a change in the form of publication of *The Open Court*. *The Open Court* will continue to be published weekly, but it will be reduced in size (namely to eight quarto pages). The magazine will be made more popular than it was before. The more abstract and specifically scientific productions will find a fitter place for publication in a new Quarterly called *The Monist*, the first number of which will appear October 1st, 1890.

The contents of the first number of *The Monist* will be as follows:

1. "Mr. A. R. Wallace on Physiological Selection."
   By *Geo. J. Romanes*, LL. D., F. R. S.
2. "The Immortality of Infusoria."
   By *Alfred Binet*.
3. "On the Material Relations of Sex in Human Society."
   By Prof. *E. D. Cope*.
4. "The Analysis of the Sensations"
   By Prof. *Ernst Mach*.
5. "The Origin of Mind."
   By Dr. *Paul Carus*.
6. "The Magic Mirror."
   By *Max Dessoir*.
7. "The Psychology of Harald Höffding."
   By *W. M. Salter*.
8. "Literary Correspondence. France."
   By *Lucien Arréat*.
9. Book Reviews.
10. Philosophy in American Colleges and Universities.
11. Periodicals.

The Open Court will continue to publish short ethical sermons, popular expositions of scientific subjects, timely notes on current topics, book reviews, etc. Holding that the monistic solution is the only tenable position, it will in the future as before, remain open to the discussion of the principal problems of philosophy, religion, ethics, and sociology.

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A few words suggest themselves with reference to the letter of Mr. Ingham, published in the last number of *The Open Court*: it is concerning the idea of God. When we define God as "the Ethical Life of Nature," we do not mean to limit God to one special part of nature. For God is the being of everything that is, be it good or evil; he is All in All. We meant to characterize for man the nature of God. God is All-Existence in so far as it serves as a basis for ethics. We make the same objections to saying that the All-Being is moral, as our correspondent does. The All-Being is the standard of morality; it is neither moral nor immoral, but we are moral or immoral according as we do or do not conform to it.

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Prof. H. D. Garrison of this city will, on Sunday next, September 28th, and the two following Sundays, at 3 P. M., lecture at the Grand Opera House, Chicago, on the *Genesis of the Heavens*, the *Genesis of Life*, and the *Genesis of Man*. We understand that the first lecture will comprise a general survey of the heavenly bodies and an attempt to account for the evolution of our solar system. All the lectures will be fully illustrated, and many of the views which will be used are made by Mr. Burnham, of the great Lick Observatory. Views of the Observatory and of the great Telescope will also be shown. Prof. Garrison is well known in Chicago as a very popular teacher. We know him as a pleasant speaker at the Evolution Club, and his lectures ought to attract large and appreciative audiences.

The Sunday Review, which is the organ of the London "Sunday Society," contains in the present number, (No. 55, Vol. XIV, July, 1890,) the annual address delivered by the President, Professor G. J. Romanes (of which advance sheets were sent us by Mr. Mark H. Judge, the honorary Secretary of the society), and a full report of the proceedings at the meeting. Professor Romanes showed the weakness of the arguments of those who oppose the opening of Museums, Art Galleries, and Libraries on Sunday, very fitly quoting the remark of M. Guyot, the Minister of Public Works in Paris, made in reply to an inquiry by the Honorary Secretary, that it was difficult for him "to appreciate the necessity of considering this question as having two sides." The opening of Museums and Galleries in France is helpful to the extension of Sunday rest, and the cessation from ordinary work on Sundays in that country is markedly on the increase.

Mr. F. May Holland begs us to state to our readers that the sentence in his article No. 159 of *The Open Court*, referring to the number of sheep *west* of the Mississippi in 1867, should have been written so as to show that there were then *east* of the Mississippi and Missouri more than twice as many sheep as there are at present.

The Open Court Clubbing Rates.

The figures of the first column (to the left) represent the yearly prices of the various magazines. The figures of the second column represent the combined (net) subscription-price for THE OPEN COURT and the magazine opposite. On orders for *additional* magazines a discount of 5 per cent. is allowed.

Architects and Builders Edition of Scientific American	$2.50	$4.00
Arena	5.00	5.50
Art Amateur	4.00	5.25
Art Interchange without col'd plates	2.50	4.25
Atlantic Monthly	4.00	5.20
Century Magazine	4.00	5.50
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Cottage Hearth The	1.50	2.50
Current Literature	3.00	4.25
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Forum The (New Subscriptions)	5.00	5.00
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Lippincott's Magazine	3.00	4.25
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Magazine of American History	5.00	6.00
Microscope The	1.00	2.75
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New Review	1.75	3.75
North American Review	5.00	6.00
Popular Science Monthly	5.00	6.00
Public Opinion, New Subscribers	3.00	4.25
Public Opinion, Old Subscribers	3.00	4.50
Science	3.50	4.80
Scientific American	3.00	4.50
Scientific American Supplement	5.00	6.00
Scribner's Magazine	3.00	4.40
St. Nicholas	3.00	4.50
Twentieth Century	2.00	3.50
Wide Awake	2.40	4.00